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[1]  Business and war have one thing in common: strategy.  “Never to be 
undertaken thoughtlessly or recklessly, [strategy is] to be preceded by 
measures designed to make it easy to” obtain the desired outcome.1  “A 
skilled general must be master of the complementary arts of simulation and 
dissimulation; while creating shapes to confuse and delude the [negotiating 
adversary] he conceals his true dispositions and ultimate intent.”2  His actions 
“are designed to entice the [adversary], to unbalance him, and to create a 
situation favourable for a decisive counter-stroke.”3     
 
                                                 
* Thomas Speiss is an associate attorney with the law firm of Wasserman, Comden, 
Casselman & Pearson LLP in Los Angeles, California.  He received his B.A. from James 
Madison University in 1993, and his J.D. from the Villanova University School of Law in 
1997.  Mr. Speiss wishes to thank David B. Casselman, Esq., Leonard J. Comden, Esq. and 
Christine A. Pagac, Esq. for their assistance with this article.  
** Stephen M. Levine is Of Counsel to the law firm of Wasserman, Comden, Casselman 
& Pearson LLP in Los Angeles, California.  He received his B.A. from The Johns Hopkins 
University in 1985, and his J.D. from New York University School of Law in 1988.  Mr. 
Levine wishes to thank Carol L. Casselman, Esq. and Aaron J. Cronan, Esq. for their 
assistance with this article.   
1 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 39 (Samuel B. Griffith ed., 1963); see also CLAUSEWITZ 
ON STRATEGY: INSPIRATION AND INSIGHT FROM A MASTER STRATEGIST 4-5 (Tiha von 
Ghyczy et al. eds., 2001) (“Business and war may have many elements in common, but as 
total phenomena they will remain separated forever by the distinct and irreconcilable nature 
of the forces that give rise to them and the outcomes they engender.”). 
2 TZU, supra note 1, at 41. 
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[2]  As trademark practitioners, we must function as skilled generals, leading 
our clients not to victory, but to the precipice of informed decision-making.  
We must prepare our clients for battle  regardless of which battle they 
choose to enter  in order to resolve their disputes or gain a competitive 
advantage.  Our preparation for business dispute resolution should remain the 
same, regardless of whether our clients desire to negotiate, mediate, or 
litigate their disputes to an acceptable conclusion.    
 
[3]  First, evidence must be gathered and analyzed.4  Second, the immediacy 
of the injury to our clients must be fully examined.  Third, the business costs 
and probable outcomes of the seeking and granting of remedies must be 
thoroughly examined.5  Fourth, after fully apprising our clients of all facts 
related to the injury, we must counsel them to select the appropriate 
mechanism in order to resolve the matter.6  Fifth, the parties must then 
communicate back and forth, looking for agreement.7   
 
[4]  This article centers on the third stage.  It provides a practical look at the 
litigation and non-litigation mechanisms for remedying trademark disputes.   
 
[5]  Though many brand owners desire to use the judicial process to resolve 
their trademark disputes, “the judicial process involves a high degree of risk 
and uncertainty in outcome, unpredictable delays, invasive discovery 
proceedings, and a substantial cost of time and money.”8  Typically, when a 
                                                 
4 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN, 12 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).  As part of this process, practitioners “will 
want to consider the people problems of partisan perceptions, hostile emotions, and unclear 
communication, as well as identify [their] interests and those of the other side.”  Id. at 12-14.   
5 During this stage, practitioners must determine how they will handle people problems, 
identify the most important interests for their clients, as well as realistic objectives, and 
generate several options for resolving the dispute.  Id. at 14.   
6 Id.   
7 Id.  Practitioners that analyze the dispute solely from a litigation perspective conduct a 
five-step analysis.  Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating 
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999).  First, they ask: “[h]ow much is a case 
like this worth?”  Second, they analyze their likelihood of success on the merits.  Third, they 
examine the discovery process: “[h]ow much information do I need to gather,” and “[h]ow 
do I evaluate the strength of the information that I gather?”  Fourth, they evaluate the 
settlements: “[w]hat constitutes a good outcome,” and “[w]hat is a fair resolution of this 
matter?”  Finally, they analyze the negotiation process: “[s]hould I make the first offer or 
wait until the other side makes it;” “[i]f I make it, how extreme should it be;” “[h]ow should 
I frame or present my offer;” “[h]ow should I evaluate offers from the other side;” and 
“[h]ow can I get people to accept my offers (or counter-offers)?”  Id.  
8 Myer Sankary, Legal Negotiations in Mediation Proceedings 1 (Nov. 20, 2002) 
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party files a complaint and seeks injunctive relief, it is the result of a failed 
business negotiation.  It may also stem from the desire of the well-heeled 
party to seek an advantage in crafting a business agreement.  In filing a 
complaint, a brand owner may also subject themselves to antitrust claims, 
based upon misuse of their intellectual property assets.9 
 
[6]  Perhaps the single most important factor in the outcome of trademark 
litigation10 is whether preliminary injunctive relief is granted.11  When a 
defendant begins using the plaintiff’s mark in commerce, the impact on the 
plaintiff’s business is often immediate and potentially devastating.12  Each 
sale of the defendant’s product or service takes money directly out of the 
plaintiff’s pocket, depriving the plaintiff of goodwill benefits earned through 
the selection and marketing of its brand.  Consumers are potentially damaged 
as well.  They innocently purchase products or services under the mistaken 
belief that such products or services are affiliated with the plaintiff.  
Furthermore, in many cases, the defendant’s products or services are inferior, 
and their continuing presence in the marketplace could cause more harm than 
the judicial system could compensate with monetary damages.  
 
                                                 
9 Oftentimes, an alleged infringer of intellectual property rights defends itself against an 
action by pointing to the culpable conduct of the rights’ holder.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) 
(2000) (codification of trademark misuse); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000) (codification of patent 
misuse).  See generally Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (patent 
misuse); Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516 (1903) (trademark misuse); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2003), 
aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (copyright misuse).  An aggressive litigation foe, 
however, may file a cross complaint for antitrust based upon misuse of the intellectual 
property assets.  See generally Grokster, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (antitrust based on copyright 
misuse); Marchon Eyewear, Inc. v. Tura L.P., No. 98-CV-1932, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19628 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (antitrust based on patent misuse); Juno Online Servs., L.P. 
v. Juno Lighting, Inc. , 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (antitrust based on trademark 
misuse).    
10 Although the issues discussed in this article generally apply equally to trademarks, 
service marks, and trade dress, in consideration of simplicity, only the terms “trademark” or 
“mark” are used. 
11 See WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL 
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 13:151 (2004) (“The hearing on the application for preliminary 
injunction is often the single most important hearing in the case.”); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:30 (4th ed. 2004) (“[I]f 
plaintiff obtains a preliminary injunction, it immediately has the upper hand in the strategy 
of the whole litigation.”). 
12 In one court’s opinion, “‘damages occasioned by trademark infringement are by their 
very nature irreparable.’”  Int’l Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092, 
(7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 
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[7]  A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction 
provides immediate relief to the plaintiff, preventing further use of the 
trademark by the infringing party.  The relief allowed may also include the 
seizure of the infringing items.  Courts, however, treat such requests by 
plaintiffs with extreme caution so that the defendant is not prevented from 
conducting its business, or some part of it, without a full hearing on the 
merits of the infringement claim.   
 
[8]  From a strategic standpoint, the main advantage of seeking preliminary 
injunctive relief is that the plaintiff can immediately prevent the defendant 
from using the mark, without having to wait for a trial on the merits.  This 
can significantly disrupt the business of the defendant.  Another advantage is 
that obtaining a preliminary injunction is likely to induce settlement.  This is 
because the defendant must make a quick decision as to whether to appeal 
the grant of injunctive relief.  The defendant must also assess the likelihood 
of overcoming the preliminary finding that the plaintiff is likely to prevail at 
a trial on the merits.   
 
[9]  The disadvantages of seeking injunctive relief stem from the risk of 
failure and the expense associated with making a request for an interim 
injunction.  An unsuccessful attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction may 
weaken the plaintiff’s ability to prevail at a bench or jury trial,13 or obtain a 
favorable settlement.14  This is because the denial of the request may be the 
result of a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s case is weak.  If interim 
injunctive relief is granted, but the plaintiff loses at trial, the plaintiff may 
have to forfeit the injunction bond.  Worse yet, if the interim injunction was 
improperly obtained, the plaintiff may be open to a damages suit by the 
defendant.   
                                                 
13 Upon the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff can request either a bench or jury trial. 
See Fed.R. Civ.P. 38 and 39. Further, there exists a right for any party to the action to 
demand a jury trial. This right will granted depending upon whether equitable relief is 
requested. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); see also Ringling 
BrosBarnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Dev., 955 F. 
Supp. 598 (E.D. Va 1997) (jury trial was not granted to the plaintiff in trademark dilution 
case because under 15 U.S.C.S. Section 1125(c)(1)-(2) plaintiff was limited to injunctive 
relief). Historically, litigants have favored having their cases heard before the judge 
rather than the jury. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, (4th ed. 2004) at § 32:130.  However, jury trials have become 
much more common in trademark infringement cases.  Id.   
14 In addition, a successful defendant may choose to file a Rule 68 offer of judgment, 
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[10]  Furthermore, the granting of an interim injunction may require an 
expeditious request for relief by the plaintiff.  For instance, should a party 
decide to move for a TRO, this will require significant preparation effort 
concentrated in a short period of time.  Therefore, before traveling down the 
slippery slope of litigation, a sophisticated attorney may desire to explore 
non-litigation remedies, including mediation and arbitration.  
 
[11]  This article has four parts.  Part I discusses the granting of interim 
injunctive relief.  Here, the authors provide an overview of the legal 
framework for securing interim injunctive relief in the form of TROs and 
preliminary injunctions.  In Part II, the practicalities of securing these forms 
of relief are discussed.  Also included in Part II is a discussion of factors 
courts use in determining the appropriateness of the injunctive relief.  Part III 
provides a discussion of the negotiation process for resolving trademark 
disputes in lieu of, or simultaneous with, the filing for interim injunctive 
relief.  This process will be entered into regardless of whether interim 
injunctive relief is granted or denied.  Part IV concludes that all clients must 
be fully counseled and apprised of all of the remedies, including their 
respective costs, available to them prior to filing litigation.   
 
I. GARNERING INTERIM INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 
A. What Is an Injunction? 
 
[12]  In the context of trademark infringement cases, injunctive relief allows 
the plaintiff to prevent any further use of an infringing mark by the defendant 
during the pendency of an action.15  Mandatory injunctions “order[] a 
responsible party to ‘take action,’” and prohibitory injunctions “‘restrain[]’ a 
responsible party from further violati[ons].”16 
                                                 
15 For instance, courts may, pursuant to section 34(d)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, order 
the ex parte seizure of infringing goods bearing counterfeit marks.  15 U.S.C. § 
1116(d)(1)(A) (2000).  “Such orders may involve the seizure of goods that were produced by 
and belong to a foreign entity, but that are located within the United States.”  Am. Online, 
Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (E.D. Va. 2003); see, e.g., Bear U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Kim, 71 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244- 45 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (describing the issuance of an ex parte 
seizure order directed at counterfeit parkas).  
16 Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996).  Preliminary injunctive relief in 
the context of trademark infringement is generally thought of as prohibitory, because its 
purpose is to prohibit further use of an infringing mark by the defendant pending a trial on 
the merits.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:30.  This distinction can be critical, since 
mandatory preliminary injunctions are subject to a higher level of scrutiny than prohibitory 
preliminary injunctions, and are therefore more difficult to obtain.  See Anderson v. United 
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[13]  In order to obtain injunctive relief in trademark actions, the movant 
must demonstrate irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies.17  
Furthermore, because injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, it will not be 
issued as a matter of course; courts will generally balance the potential effect 
of the injunction on each party as well as on the public.18  In trademark 
infringement cases, the Lanham Act specifically provides for injunctive relief 
“according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may 
deem reasonable.”19  In fact, injunctive relief is the most commonly accepted 
                                                                                                                         
beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite, is particularly disfavored, and 
should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.”); see also 
Cornwell v. Sachs, 99 F. Supp. 2d 695, 703 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“Mandatory preliminary 
injunctions do not preserve the status quo and normally should be granted only in those 
circumstances when the exigencies of the situation demand such relief.”).   
Because the distinction is based upon the effect on the party to be enjoined, it is critical 
for the plaintiff to frame its application for relief in prohibitory language, rather than 
mandatory language.  See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:13.  For example, a 
preliminary injunction ordering a party not to use a trademark pending trial would be 
classified as a prohibitory injunction because its effect is to prohibit the enjoined party from 
action, while a preliminary injunction ordering a party to pay royalties pending trial would 
be classified as a mandatory injunction because its effect is to compel the enjoined party to 
take action.  See id. 
17 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“The Court has 
repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been 
irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”).  See also MCCARTHY, supra note 
11, § 30:31 (citations omitted); infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
18 See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987), which states: 
 
In each case, a court must balance the competing 
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each 
party of the granting or withholding of the requested 
relief.  Although particular regard should be given to 
the public interest, “[the] grant of jurisdiction to 
ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an 
absolute duty to do so under any and all 
circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as 
chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an 
injunction for every violation of law.” 
 
Id. at 542 (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000).  The Lanham Act is the federal statutory basis for relief 
from trademark infringement; it provides, in pertinent part, that: 
 
[t]he several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil 
actions arising under this Act shall have power to 
grant injunctions, according to the principles of 
equity and upon such terms as the court may deem 
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remedy for trademark infringement,20 the Lanham Act being simply the 
codification of the traditional remedy.21  The courts have great flexibility in 
fashioning injunctive relief in trademark infringement cases, allowing them 
to tailor the injunction to fit the facts of the action.22 
 
B. What Is the Primary Purpose of Interim Injunctive Relief? 
 
[14]  Although often not listed as a specific requirement for obtaining interim 
injunctive relief, maintaining the status quo — the snapshot of time that 
                                                                                                                         
registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and 
Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under 
subsection (a), (c), or (d) of this section 43. Any such 
injunction may include a provision directing the 
defendant to file with the court and serve on the 
plaintiff within thirty days after the service on the 
defendant of such injunction, or such extended period 
as the court may direct, a report in writing under oath 
setting forth in detail the manner and form in which 
the defendant has complied with the injunction. Any 
such injunction granted upon hearing, after notice to 
the defendant, by any district court of the United 
States, may be served on the parties against whom 
such injunction is granted anywhere in the United 
States where they may be found, and shall be 
operative and may be enforced by proceedings to 
punish for contempt, or otherwise, by the court by 
which such injunction was granted, or by any other 
United States district court in whose jurisdiction the 
defendant may be found.   
 
Id.  
20 See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:1 (discussing the equitable remedy of injunction 
as the traditional remedy for unfair competition and trademark infringement cases). 
21 See Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 293 (C.D. Cal. 1992). 
22 According to the court in Kelley Blue Book:  
 
[i]n trademark cases, the courts are given flexibility 
in fashioning injunctive relief, and “the scope of the 
injunction to be entered depends upon the manner in 
which plaintiff is harmed, the possible means by 
which that precise harm can be avoided, the viability 
of the defense raised, and the relative inconvenience 
that would be caused to defendant by each of the 
several means of avoidance.” 
 
Id. at 293-94 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
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immediately preceded the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant — 
is the primary purpose of interim injunctive relief.23  In other words, the 
plaintiff must show that a TRO or preliminary injunction will restore the last 
non-contested state of affairs between the two parties.24  Although forms of 
preliminary injunctive relief that would alter the status quo, such as 
mandatory injunctions, are not automatically denied, they carry a heavier 
burden of persuasion.25 
 
[15]  In the context of trademark infringement cases, the status quo to be 
preserved by the injunction is the state of affairs that existed prior to the 
defendant’s use of the contested trademark.26  This, of course, is usually 
exactly what the plaintiff seeks pending a trial on the merits. 
 
C. Forms of Interim Injunctive Relief  
 
1. Temporary Restraining Order 
 
[16]  A TRO is a provisional remedy.  It can be issued under narrow 
circumstances without notice to the opposing party or that party’s counsel.  
The purpose of the TRO is to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable 
harm pending a hearing on the moving party’s application for preliminary 
injunctive relief.27  A TRO is effective for a limited period of time, usually 
ten calendar days, unless good cause is shown or the parties agree 
otherwise.28  
                                                 
23 See Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1963) (“It is 
so well settled as not to require citation of authority that the usual function of a preliminary 
injunction is to preserve the status quo ante litem pending a determination of the action on 
the merits.”); see also Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 400 
(6th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative 
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”). 
24 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Free Sewing Mach. Co., 256 F.2d 806, 808, (7th Cir. 
1958) (“The status quo is the last uncontested status which preceded the pending 
controversy.”); see also Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 
1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th 
Cir. 2000).   
25 See Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995). 
26 See Earth Tech. Corp. v. Envtl. Research & Tech., Inc., No. 82-6375 AWT, 1983 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18316, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1983). 
27 See Clements Wire and Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 894, 896-97 (5th Cir. 1979); see 
also Nat’l City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565, 567-68 (6th Cir. 1977).  
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); see Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 
415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974).  Upon ordering the TRO, the court will likely enter an Order to 
Show Cause why a preliminary injunction should issue.  In addition, the restrained party is 
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[17]  A party seeking a TRO must make a persuasive showing of irreparable 
harm and demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.29  The single 
most important factor that courts examine in determining whether to grant a 
TRO is the exigency of the circumstances.30  Exigency requires a showing 
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the 
movant, unless the non-moving party is restrained.31  Thus, the plaintiff must 
show that it is acting quickly to obtain a TRO.  If the plaintiff waits too long 
to bring suit or to seek interim relief, the court may conclude that there is not 
a pressing need for an immediate prohibition order.   
 
[18]  There are no set rules on how quickly the movant must file for a TRO.32  
The exigency of the circumstances is decided on a case-by-case basis.  Courts 
examine the exigency of the circumstances from the plaintiff’s perspective, 
and from the public’s perspective when concern for the public is a factor. 
 
2. Preliminary Injunction 
 
[19]  A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy issued prior to final 
disposition of the litigation.  The function of a preliminary injunction is to 
preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to a final 
judgment on the merits.33  The requirements for preliminary injunctive relief 
differ in each circuit.  Generally, courts consider the following factors when 
deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in trademark 
infringement cases: (1) the exigency of the circumstances, which includes the 
                                                                                                                         
TRO.  See Clements Wire and Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d at 896; see also Nat’l City Bank, 581 F.2d 
at 567. 
29 New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977).   
30 “Exigency” is defined as “[a] state of urgency; a situation requiring immediate 
action.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 614 (8th ed. 2004). 
31 A TRO should not issue under Rule 65(b) unless immediate irreparable injury is 
threatened.  See In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1979); Ragold, Inc. v. 
Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117, 123 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1980).   
32 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:145.  Still, the earlier the better: 
 
An application for preliminary injunction may be 
filed at any time.  However, as with TRO 
applications, it is always wise to request such relief 
as early as practicable.  Delay may cause the court to 
conclude there is no “immediate” threat of injury and 
that the matter can wait until a trial on the merits.   
Id.    
33 Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); 
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plaintiff’s irreparable injury; (2) the probability of success on the merits of 
the action at trial; (3) a determination of the parties’ relative hardships that 
would result from the decision; (4) protection of the public interest; and (5) 
maintenance of the status quo pendente lite.34  However, unlike a TRO, any 
delay in filing for preliminary injunctive relief is but one of several factors 
courts consider when deciding whether to grant this provisional remedy.35  
 
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERIM INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 
[20]  Preliminary injunctive relief may be had in two forms: TRO and 
preliminary injunction.  Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide the general rules for obtaining either a TRO or a preliminary 
                                                 
34 See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:31 (discussing how the moving party must 
demonstrate that: (1) there is a probability of success on the merits at the ultimate trial; (2) it 
will be irreparably harmed unless injunction is issued; (3) interim injunctive relief will 
preserve status quo; (4) hardships balance in its favor; and (5) an injunction may be 
necessary to protect third parties); see also SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:44-45 
(discussing the “traditional test,” which requires: (1) a fair chance of success on the merits; 
(2) a significant threat of irreparable injury; (3) a balance of hardships that tips minimally in 
the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that the public interest favors preliminary injunctive relief, as 
well as the “alternative test,” which requires the moving party to show either “[a] 
combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or 
[s]erious questions as to these matters and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the] 
plaintiff’s favor”).  
35 See Sandra Edelman, Delay in Filing Preliminary Injunction Motions: Update 2002, 
92 TRADEMARK REP. 647 (2002), who asserts that:  
 
when a case is weak on the merits, the court is more 
likely to find the plaintiff’s delay to be inexcusable, 
providing a clear and convenient reason for denying 
the relief requested.  Conversely, when a defendant 
has acted intentionally or engaged in other egregious 
conduct, the court is likely to de-emphasize the issue 
of delay and be more tolerant of a plaintiff's failure to 
move promptly. 
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injunction,36 the specific procedural rules must be gleaned from case law and 
local rules.37 
 




[21]  A TRO is the quickest way for a plaintiff to halt a defendant’s use of an 
infringing trademark.38  A TRO is essentially an order from a court to a 
defendant to immediately cease any further use of an infringing mark; its sole 
purpose is to preserve the status quo pending a hearing on the plaintiff’s 
application for a preliminary injunction.39  Generally, the first step in 
obtaining a TRO, as is the case in any lawsuit, is to file the complaint for 
infringement.40  
                                                 
36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.  Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules discusses the standards for the 
granting of a preliminary injunction; Rule 65(b) discusses the granting of a TRO; Rule 65(c) 
discusses the security or bond the court must consider ordering to be posted when the TRO 
or injunction issues; Rule 65(d) discusses the form and scope of the TRO or injunction; and 
Rule 65(e) discusses the effect of Rule 65 on other statutes.  Id.  Finally, Rule 65.1 discusses 
surety liability.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65.1. 
37 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:85.  For practitioners, there are several 
critical steps to take when considering procedural strategy in seeking preliminary injunctive 
relief: first, the practitioner should become familiar with Rule 65; second, the practitioner 
should become familiar with the local court rules concerning preliminary injunctive relief; 
and third, the practitioner should contact the relevant court clerk to get informal information 
on the judge’s procedural preferences. Id. § 13:85.1 to :86. 
38 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear, Inc., No. C-96-2783, 1996 WL 
657219, at *1543 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1996) (granting BUDWEISER mark owner a TRO 
prohibiting defendant’s use of “Buttweiser” on t-shirts); Giacalone v. Network Solutions, 
Inc., No. C-96-20434, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20807, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996) 
(granting owner of the website “ty.com” a TRO against Ty, Inc. on ground that defendant 
was unlawfully attempting to extend its scope of trademark registration to areas where it had 
no legal right to protection).  
39 See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2951 (3d ed. 1998).  The distinguishing aspect of a TRO is that it is issued 
without affording the party to be restrained the opportunity to argue against it, and 
sometimes without even notice to the party that the TRO is being sought.  See id.  Foreign 
jurisdictions also understand the exigency of issuing a TRO.  See Sandy Meng-Shan Liu, 
After WTO Accession: China’s Dilemma with the Trafficking of Fakes, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 
1153, 1173 (2003) (“[A] temporary restraining order can . . . be obtained to preserve pre-trial 
evidence if the registrant can prove that evidence may be destroyed, lost, or unlikely to be 
obtained in the future.”) (citations omitted).     
40 See Stewart v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 193, 198 
(2d Cir. 1985) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.  65 (a)(2)) (“Only after an action has been commenced 
can preliminary injunctive relief be obtained.”).  However, when the need for swift relief is 
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[22]  The application for the TRO41 is generally filed simultaneously with the 
complaint.42 In addition to the complaint and application, the plaintiff should 
submit a legal brief outlining the relevant legal issues, as well as an Order to 
Show Cause (“OSC”) as to why a preliminary injunction should issue.43  The 
brief should be succinct  since the court will have very little time to 
analyze it  yet complete, explaining in detail why relief should be granted 
immediately instead of following a trial on the merits.44  Furthermore, the 
brief must address the relevant requirements for preliminary injunctive relief 
as discussed below,45 particularly the facts showing immediate and 
irreparable injury.46 
 
[23]  The plaintiff must couch its TRO request as an urgent and compelling 
need for immediate relief.47  It must show such immediacy through 
“irreparable injury.”48  Irreparable injury in trademark cases is often defined 
as a “‘high probability of confusion, [such that] injury [is] irreparable in the 
                                                                                                                         
Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Because of the exigencies of time usual 
in contests for corporate control . . . . the court could properly treat the affidavit as a 
complaint and the order to show cause as requiring an early answer.”). 
41 This application is referred to in some courts as a “motion for temporary restraining 
order.”  See, e.g., E.D. CAL. L.R. 65-231(c). 
42 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:91.  However, unlike permanent 
injunctions or declaratory judgments, which require prayer for relief within the complaint, 
preliminary injunctive relief can be requested for the first time by motion.  See Dillard v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th Cir. 1992). 
43 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:92; see also J. Joseph Bainton, 
Reflections on the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984: Score a Few for the Good 
Guys, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 19-20 (1992) (explaining that if an injured party desires to 
move for ex parte seizure and impoundment order, it should present affidavits, evidence, 
and an Order to Show Cause for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary 
Injunction, and Accelerated Discovery).  
44 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:93. Likewise, if the defendant is provided 
with the opportunity to submit a brief in opposition to the issuance of the TRO, it should file 
a similarly succinct and complete brief as to why the TRO should not issue.  
45 See infra notes 59-75, 85-95 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text. 
47 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951 (“The issuance of an ex parte 
temporary restraining order is an emergency procedure and is appropriate only when the 
applicant is in need of immediate relief.”) (citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
65(b).  
48 See Mountain Med. Equip., Inc. v. Healthdyne, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 846, 848 (D. Colo. 
1984) (“Although there is no black letter definition of what constitutes an irreparable injury, 
the essence of the concept requires a substantial threat of harm to the movant that cannot be 
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sense that it may not be fully compensable in damages.’”49  A plaintiff can 
demonstrate irreparable injury by showing a likelihood of confusion between 
the plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark.50  In order to demonstrate a 
likelihood of confusion, a plaintiff can allege numerous trademark 
infringement claims, including false advertising,51 unfair competition,52 
                                                 
49 Nat’l Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns v. Flint Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 
764 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Omega Import. Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 
451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
50 According to Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000):  
 
[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the 
registrant  (a) use in commerce any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a 
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering 
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the 
registrant . . . .  
 
In trademark infringement, a majority of courts hold that a showing of likelihood of 
confusion is sufficient to demonstrate irreparable injury.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 
30:47.  An immediate loss of reputation is an unquantifiable loss that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to compensate through an award of money damages.  See Rodeo Collection, Ltd. 
v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Once the plaintiff in an infringement 
action has established a likelihood of confusion, it is ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff 
will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief does not issue.”).  Trademark infringement 
injuries are presumed to be irreparable because “it is virtually impossible to ascertain the 
precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to reputation and loss 
of goodwill, caused by such violations.”  Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 
16 (7th Cir. 1992).  Other courts view a showing of likelihood of confusion as merely 
persuasive evidence of irreparable injury.  See, e.g., Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 
Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 4 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We say merely that such evidence 
does not amount to a legal presumption; it is proof that, like other factual evidence, may be 
rebutted by other facts and circumstances.”). 
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).  In order to make a colorable claim for 
false advertising, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant uses a designation or 
false designation of origin in interstate commerce, and in connection with goods or services, 
when the designation is likely to cause confusion, deception or mistake as to: “[(1)] the 
affiliation, connection, or association of [defendant] with another person, or [(2)] as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of [defendant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person,” and the plaintiff has been or is likely to be damaged by these acts.  Id.  
“Remedies for false advertising include: a preliminary and final injunction; corrective 
advertising; and monetary recovery.”  See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 27:13 (citations 
omitted).  
52 “The law of unfair competition generally protects consumers and competitors from 
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dilution,53 incontestability of the right to use the mark under certain 
conditions,54 and breach of contract, all of which would cause the plaintiff to 
lose control of its reputation as to the goods or services improperly marked 
by the defendant.   
 
[24]  Once the court determines that a plaintiff can lay claim to a likelihood 
of confusion, the court then examines whether the plaintiff has established 
that it has a likelihood of success on the merits in the underlying lawsuit 
sufficient to establish irreparable injury.55 When trademark infringement is at 
issue, this showing is easily made in those jurisdictions following the rule 
that a demonstration of likely confusion or dilution creates a presumption of 
irreparable harm.56   
 
                                                                                                                         
Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  “Unfair competition is a commercial tort.”  
MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 1:8.  It includes within its spectrum claims for the 
infringement of the right of publicity, which is the legal right to control the commercial use 
of an individual’s identity.  Id. § 28:1.  The infringement of the right of publicity is both a 
commercial tort and a form of unfair competition.  Id.   
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000).  In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 277 F.3d. 253 (2d Cir. 2002), a motion picture studio that produced 
a film based on a particular set of comic book characters brought an action against the 
studio’s licensor, publishers of comic books, and producers of a related television series 
based on them.  It unsuccessfully sought an injunction on the basis that the television series 
violated the studio’s contractual rights and its rights under the Lanham Act.  Id. at 257-60.   
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000); see, e.g., Re/Max N. Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424, 
433 (7th Cir. 2001) (granting plaintiff a preliminary injunction against the franchisee for its 
continued use of the Re/Max mark upon the expiration of the franchise agreement). 
55 See Perry Viscounty et al., Arguing Likelihood of Confusion: The Importance of 
Trademark Experience and Forensic Skill, CLIENTTIMES (Thomson & Thomson, North 
Quincy, Mass.), Dec. 2003, at 3 (“Although various courts and trademark examiners may 
believe they are employing the same tests in determining whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion, their analysis is inherently subjective.  For that reason, different decision makers 
often reach contrary results, even when presented with the same or similar facts.”).   
56 See e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“Irreparable harm is generally presumed in cases of trademark infringement and dilution.”); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Action Software, 136 F. Supp. 2d 735, 739 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(“Irreparable harm is . . . presumed in actions for . . . trademark infringement.”); Villanova 
Univ. v. Villanova Alumni Educ. Found., 123 F. Supp. 2d 293, 310 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(“Irreparable injury follows a showing of likelihood of confusion ‘as a matter of course.’”) 
(quoting Opticians Assoc. of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 
1990)); Davidoff & CIE SA v. PLD Int’l Corp., No. 00-2635, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19243, 
at *14 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“Irreparable injury is presumed for trademark infringement.”); 
Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World Found., Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 481, 493 
(D.N.J. 2000) (“Since infringement of trademark deprives the owner of control over its 
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[25]  The court may also balance the harm suffered by the defendant if the 
order were issued against the injury the movant would suffer if the 
application for the TRO were denied.57  In addition, it may be appropriate for 
the court to consider the effect of the requested order on the public interest.58  
As such, a plaintiff moving for injunctive relief must painstakingly prepare 
its papers, including a complete marshalling of the facts and accompanying 
declarations.  In some circumstances, a plaintiff must also be prepared to 
present its witnesses to the court, should the matter be heard.   
 
[26]  However, the more complex the matter, the less inclined the court will 
be to grant a TRO, due to the factual analysis that must be undertaken.  When 
the plaintiff presents an exhaustive discussion of the facts in its TRO papers, 
the court will be more inclined to issue an OSC.  Therefore, the plaintiff’s 
presentation of its application for a TRO must be succinct, compelling, and 
without a lengthy factual discussion.  
 
2. Supporting Evidence 
 
[27]  Along with the complaint, application, and brief, the plaintiff should 
submit any relevant evidence supporting its brief, particularly if the plaintiff 
is seeking a TRO without notice to the party to be restrained.59  Generally, 
detailed declarations and affidavits are the most effective means of providing 
                                                 
57 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951 (“This balancing of the hardships approach 
is fairly common, particularly when one of the parties is a governmental unit.”) (citations 
omitted).  
58 Id. (citing Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992)).  
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) states, in relevant part, that: 
 
[a] temporary restraining order may be granted 
without written or oral notice . . . only if (1) it clearly 
appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by 
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable 
injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant 
before the adverse party or the party’s attorney can be 
heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant’s attorney 
certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, 
which have been made to give the notice and the 
reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be 
required.  
 
But see Ziegman Prods., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 496 F. Supp. 965, 967 (E.D. Wis. 1980) 
(holding that a TRO may be denied on the grounds that inadequate effort was made to notify 
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factual support.60  For example, affidavits from consumers showing actual 
confusion as to the marks can be an effective way of showing likelihood of 
confusion.61  In addition, because of the time constraints involved, courts are 
generally lenient in accepting various forms of evidence, such as deposition 
testimony or counsel declarations, including evidence that would be 
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.62  However, the court has 
discretion to determine the weight such evidence will carry, and tends to look 
upon inadmissible evidence with skepticism, especially where no notice is 
provided to the defendant.63  Therefore, the affidavit must be based on 
                                                 
60 For instance, in LTT International Development and Trading Corp. v. ABC 
Distributing, Inc., No. CV 00-00776 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2000) (unreported case in which Mr. 
Speiss, co-author, participated as counsel), both the plaintiff and defendant were juvenile toy 
and home furnishing manufacturers.  The plaintiff alleged trademark and copyright 
infringement, as well as violations of state unfair competition laws due to the unauthorized 
creation of knock-off children’s stuffed bear, duck, and elephant toy stools.  The plaintiff 
moved for a TRO.  In support of its application, it filed declarations evidencing actual 
confusion, including the testimony of a distributor that purchased the defendant’s products, 
believing them to be associated with the plaintiff.  The plaintiff also filed declarations from 
corporate executives regarding their conversations with wholesalers who exhibited confusion 
between the products.  These executives discussed the loss of goodwill in their products due 
to the “cheap” quality of the defendant’s products.  As a result, the court granted the TRO.  
61 See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Props., Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 498, 500 (2d 
Cir. 1962) (upholding the lower court’s grant of a preliminary injunction based on consumer 
affidavits showing confusion as to affiliation). 
62 See Sierra Club v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A]t 
the preliminary injunction stage, the procedures in the district court are less formal, and the 
district court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay evidence.”); 
see also Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The urgency of 
obtaining a preliminary injunction necessitates a prompt determination . . . .  The trial court 
may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of 
preventing irreparable harm before trial.”). 
Likewise, in defending against the issuance of a TRO, a defendant may submit 
deposition testimony or counsel declarations, including evidence that would be inadmissible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is best to consult all appropriate Federal and local 
rules, as well as case law, that govern the submission of evidence prior to submission.   
63 See SCHWARZER ET AL. supra note 11, § 13:107.  WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, 
§ 2952, discusses the use of affidavits in support of a TRO:  
  
There does not seem to be any case law defining the 
applicable standards for judging the quality and 
character of an affidavit offered in support of a 
motion under Rule 65(b).  Since a temporary 
restraining order generally is sought on short notice, 
in a situation of pressing need, and Rule 65(b) 
expressly permits its issuance on the presentation of a 
verified complaint, it probably is unsound to hold the 
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personal knowledge and state the facts supporting the position of the movant 
clearly and specifically.64 
 
[28]  A TRO may also be issued on the basis of a verified complaint.65  This 
is not a recommended strategy, however, since pleadings are generally too 
conclusion-driven and generalized in scope.66  In addition, rather than file for 
a TRO, a movant may decide to informally provide the non-moving party 
with the evidence it intends to file in support of the application for a TRO, so 
that the non-moving party can evaluate whether it desires to immediately 
initiate settlement discussions.67    
 
3. The Movant Should Submit a Proposed TRO, Including a Provision 
for a Bond to be Posted 
 
[29]  The movant should also submit a proposed TRO, including a provision 
for a bond. The proposed TRO, according to Rule 65, should set forth the 
reason for its issuance and specify the exact actions to be enjoined, or items 
to be seized.68  These provisions are meant to protect the enjoined “by 
                                                                                                                         
example, it would be inappropriate to apply the 
standard for an affidavit offered on a summary 
judgment motion that is prescribed by Rule 56(e). 
64 See SCHWARZER ET AL. supra note 11, § 13:107.   
65 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) (“A temporary restraining order may be granted . . . only if 
(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint . . . 
.”) (emphasis added); cf. Brown v. Bernstein, 49 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.C. Pa. 1943) (holding 
that an affidavit alleging facts was sufficient to constitute irreparable injury and met the 
requirement of Rule 65(b) even though the complaint was not verified). 
66 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:104. 
67 See City Fin. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 99-CV-1323 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 1999) 
(unreported case in which Mr. Speiss, co-author, participated as counsel).  In City Financial, 
the plaintiffs alleged that their mark, CITY FINANCIAL, which had a California State 
Trademark registration and use over a twenty-year-period, was being infringed through the 
use of the CITIFINANCIAL mark by the defendants.  The plaintiffs produced several 
declarations from confused customers, as well as declarations from company employees 
concerning their receipt of telephone calls from employees of Citigroup, who mistakenly 
believed they were contacting CITIFINANCIAL.  The plaintiffs also retained Michael J. 
Wagner, a damages expert, who prepared a report that was utilized as part of the settlement 
discussions.  The action settled shortly after it was filed.   
68 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d), which requires that every order granting a restraining 
order: 
 
shall set forth the reasons for the issuance; shall be 
specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, 
and not by reference to the complaint or other 
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informing them of what they are called upon to do or refrain from doing in 
order to comply with the injunction or [TRO].”69   
 
[30]  The court must expressly consider the posting of a bond prior to the 
issuance of a TRO.70  The bond protects the defendant from damages that 
                                                                                                                         
is binding only upon the parties to the action, their 
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, 
and upon those persons in active concert or 
participation with them who receive actual notice of 
the order by personal service or otherwise. 
   
69 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2955 (citing Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 
(1974)).  
70 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c) states that: 
 
[n]o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall 
issue except upon the giving of security by the 
applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for 
the payment of such costs and damages as may be 
incurred or suffered by any party who is found to 
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained;  
 
This requirement leaves open the amount of the bond, if any, to be posted.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 65(c).  In addition, many district courts have local rules interpreting this requirement.  
See, for example, C.D. CAL. L.R. 65-3, which states that:  
 
[n]o bond or undertaking requiring third-party 
sureties will be approved unless it bears the names 
and addresses of third-party sureties and is 
accompanied by a declaration by the surety stating 
that: (a) [t]he surety is a resident of the State of 
California; (b) [t]he surety who intends to deed real 
property as security owns the real property within the 
State of California; (c) [t]he security posted by the 
surety is worth the amount specified in the bond or 
undertaking, over and above just debts and liabilities; 
and (d) [t]he property, real or personal, which is to be 
conveyed as security, is not exempt from execution 
and prejudgment attachment. 
 
  In one recent action, the TRO was granted but was not in effect for several months 
because the plaintiff failed to post the requisite bond.  In Seven Lives, Inc. v. Montoya, No. 
00-CV08851 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 21, 2000) (unreported case in which Mr. Speiss, co-author, 
participated as counsel), the plaintiff, a regional gourmet cookie and gingerbread house 
designer and manufacturer, filed suit against a former employee and his employer, Regal 
Baking Company.  Both the plaintiff and the defendant bake and “private label” cookies for 
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may be incurred if it is later determined that the injunction was issued 
wrongfully.71  However, the court does have discretion to excuse the bond in 
“exceptional” cases.72 
 
[31]  The amount of the bond is “such sum as the court deems proper, for the 
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any 
party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”73  
                                                                                                                         
alleged that the defendants had violated the trade dress and copyrights contained in the 
cookie and ginger bread house designs made by the plaintiff because they made similar-
looking Christmas and Chanukah holiday cookies, as well as other holiday-themed cookies.  
The plaintiff moved for, and received, a TRO.  The court simultaneously issued an Order to 
Show Cause why a preliminary injunction would not issue.  The TRO, however, was not in 
effect until December 7, 2000, because the plaintiff did not post the required $3,000 bond 
until that date.  
71 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the 
purpose of a bond, in the event that the defendant prevails on the merits, is to compensate 
him for harm caused by an injunction entered before the final decision); see also WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 39, § 2954 (“The purpose of this provision is to enable a restrained or 
enjoined party to secure indemnification for the costs, usually not including attorney’s fees, 
and pecuniary injury that may accrue during the period in which a wrongfully issued 
equitable order remains in effect.”) (citations omitted).  
72 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:194.  “But these [cases] are few and far 
between: ‘The instances in which a bond may not be required are so rare that the requirement 
is almost mandatory.’”  Id. (citing Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 
F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988)).  “However, other courts are more liberal, treating Rule 65(c)’s 
language ‘in such sum as the court deems proper’ as making the bond requirement entirely 
discretionary, allowing the court to waive the bond requirement in any case.”  Id. § 13:194; 
accord Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that no bond was required where the trial court found strength in the applicant’s action and 
strong public interest was involved); Pharm. Soc’y, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
50 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the public interest was served by ensuring 
that the state complied with federal law); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 
1972) (finding that the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success was particularly strong); Orantes-
Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 385 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (granting an injunction in an 
action brought by an indigent plaintiff). 
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).  WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, claims that:   
 
[a]s a result of this passage, the discretion permitted a 
federal court sitting in equity is available to a court in 
setting the amount of security that is required by Rule 
65(c).   
 
     Accordingly, the judge usually will fix security in 
an amount that covers the potential incidental and 
consequential costs as well as either the losses the 
unjustly enjoined or restrained party will suffer 
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Specifically, that sum is whatever amount the court deems necessary to cover 
the costs and damages likely to be incurred by the party being restrained 
between the date of the issuance of the TRO and the date of the hearing on 
the preliminary injunction.74  If unforeseen costs or damages arise after the 
preliminary injunction has been issued, the court may increase the amount of 




[32]  The plaintiff must attempt to give the party to be restrained notice of the 
impending application in order to allow said party the chance to be present 
and argue its case when the application is heard.76  The notice, either written 
or oral, should inform the party to be restrained of: (1) the plaintiff’s 
intention to apply for a TRO; (2) the date and time of the application hearing, 
along with any changes that may occur; and (3) the nature of the relief 
requested.77  If no notice is given, the plaintiff must submit, along with the 
complaint, application, legal brief, supporting evidence, and proposed TRO, 
a certified account of efforts to notify either the defendant or its counsel of 
the application for a TRO.78 
                                                                                                                         
certain activities or the complainant’s unjust 
enrichment caused by his adversary being improperly 
enjoined or restrained. 
 
Id. § 2954 (citations omitted).  
74 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:122. 
75 Id. § 13:201. 
76 See Arvida v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428, 429 (2d Cir. 1958) (“The reason underlying 
the rule is that failure to give notice and a chance to be heard offends our customary notions 
of fair play and violates the spirit and the letter of the Federal Rules, except in the 
extraordinary cases therein provided for.”).  From a strategic standpoint, notice should not be 
given until the moving papers are as close to prepared as possible, if not fully prepared.    
77 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2952 (“The method of giving the written 
notice referred to in [Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules] is not described in the rule itself.  
However, Rule 5(b) provides a general procedure for serving papers on opposing parties 
subsequent to [filing] the original complaint and the practice under that rule should be 
applicable to . . . Rule 65(b) . . . .”).  
78 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) which states, in relevant part, that: 
 
[a] temporary restraining order may be granted 
without written or oral notice . . . only if . . . (2) the 
applicant’s attorney certifies to the court in writing 
the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the 
notice and the reasons supporting the claim that 
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[33]  Most local rules make it clear that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
a TRO will not be issued without either actual notice or a sufficient showing 
of attempted notice.79 Extraordinary circumstances include situations where 
notice is impossible, such as when the opposing party cannot be found, or 
where such notice would render the litigation “fruitless,” such as when the 
opposing party has a history of disposing of evidence.80  An inadequate 
showing of attempted notice can prevent the granting of an otherwise 
meritorious TRO application.81  Therefore, such attempts should be made 
repeatedly and in good faith, and should be meticulously documented for the 
court.82 
 
5. Order to Show Cause 
 
[34]  When a TRO is sought, even if not granted, the preliminary injunction 
hearing is generally set by an OSC, rather than through the usual method of 
notice of motion for preliminary injunction.83  An OSC is “[a]n order 
                                                                                                                         
The plaintiff must also submit supporting evidence as discussed supra notes 59-67 and 
accompanying text.  See also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 457-58 (6th Cir. 
1980); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951.  
79 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:98. 
80 Id.  In order to demonstrate that the defendant has a history of disposing of evidence: 
 
[the] plaintiffs must show that [the] defendants would have 
disregarded a direct court order and disposed of the goods 
within the time it would take for a hearing.   
 
The applicant must support such assertions by 
showing that the adverse party has a history of disposing 
of evidence or violating court orders or that persons similar 
to the adverse party have such a history. 
 
First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1993); 
see also Fimab-Finanziara Maglificio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.P.A. v. Helio 
Imp./Exp., Inc. 601 F. Supp. 1, 2-3, 7-9 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding that where 
the disappearance of counterfeit goods and related records was possible if 
notice of the proceedings were to be given, an ex parte TRO was available 
and would be granted).  
81 See Ziegman Prods., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 496 F. Supp. 965, 967 (E.D. Wis. 
1980) (finding that efforts to notify only two deputy city attorneys was inadequate because 
notice could have been given to any of the twenty-five attorneys in the office). 
82 In addition, the restrained party must be informed of the issuance of the notice as 
soon as possible.  WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2951. 
83 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:124.  Many district courts have local rules 
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directing a party to appear in court and explain why the party took (or failed 
to take) some action or why the court should or should not grant some 
relief.”84  In other words, the plaintiff should submit, along with other 
paperwork, a proposed OSC with blanks for fixing the time and date for a 
hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. 
 
6. Procedure for Application 
 
[35]  Because of its urgent nature, a TRO application should be filed 
immediately upon learning of the infringement of the mark in question.  
Any delay may result in some question as to the urgency or irreparable 
nature of the injury.85  When the TRO application is filed along with the 
complaint, generally the complaint and accompanying paperwork (as 
discussed above) are filed with the district court clerk after attempts to 
give notice have been made.86 
 
[36]  File-stamped copies are then taken to the courtroom clerk or secretary 
of the judge to whom the case has been assigned.87  If the opposing counsel 
has appeared, copies are given to them as well.88  If the case has already been 
filed, the assigned clerk or secretary should be contacted before filing the 
application so that they can determine when the application may be 
considered.89  In this case, notice should be attempted when such time is first 
known.90 The clerk or secretary should be consulted with any questions as to 
availability of the judge.91  
 
[37]  Generally, ex parte matters are heard in between other matters, so 
counsel for both sides should be prepared to wait at the courthouse until the 
court has time to consider the application.92  When that time comes, the judge 
                                                                                                                         
set the hearing on the order to show cause without regard to the twenty-one (21) days notice 
of motion requirement of L.R. 6-1.”).   
84 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (8th ed. 2004). 
85 But see Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 369, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(finding that a delay of “slightly over two months” was insufficient to bar relief). 
86 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:109.  Many district courts have local 
rules interpreting this requirement.  See, e.g., C.D. CAL. L.R. 65-1 (“A party seeking a 
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) must submit an application, a proposed TRO, and a 
proposed order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.”).   
87 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:109. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. § 13:110. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. § 13:111. 







Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XI, Issue 1 
 
will normally ask counsel into chambers to discuss the application after 
reviewing the papers.93  Some judges require the matter to be heard by a law 
clerk or magistrate who reports their recommendations.  Other judges will 
review the matter solely on the paperwork, and still others will give the 
application a full hearing in open court.94  Of course, in an oral argument the 
plaintiff should explain the immediate and irreparable harm it will suffer 
prior to the preliminary injunction hearing.95 
 
7. Issuance and Duration 
 
[38]  When a TRO is issued without notice, it expires automatically within 
the time set out in the order, not to exceed ten days.96  If no date is fixed in 
the order itself, the duration is deemed to be ten days.97  This duration may 
be extended for an additional equal term upon a showing of good cause or by 
consent of both parties.98  “Good cause” may exist when: “(1) plaintiff has 
been unable to serve defendant with the TRO; (2) it is not possible to obtain a 
hearing date within the [ten]-day period; or (3) discovery needed for the 
preliminary injunction cannot be completed within the [ten]-day period.”99   
 
[39]  Despite any such showing of good cause, a TRO cannot remain in 
effect for more than twenty days without the consent of the enjoined party.100  
                                                 
93 Id. § 13:113. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. § 13:114. 
96 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
97 Id.; see Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Myers, 439 F.2d 834, 836 (3d Cir. 1971).   
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); see Hudson v. Barr, 3 F.3d 970, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1993). 
99 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:129.  Compare id. with WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 39, § 2953, which states: 
 
Although there does not seem to be any case law on 
what constitutes “good cause” for purposes of 
extending a Rule 65(b) order, a showing that the 
grounds for originally granting the temporary 
restraining order continue to exist should be 
sufficient. The text of Rule 65(b) seems to exclude 
any possibility that a temporary restraining order can 
remain in force beyond twenty days. 
 
100 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).  Consent may be express or implied.  SCHWARZER ET AL., 
supra note 11, § 13:131.  For example, consent is implied by the enjoined party’s consent to 
a continuance of the motion for preliminary injunction hearing date.  Id.; see Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 430 (11th Cir. 1982). However, refusal of such continuance 
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If the court does continue the TRO beyond the twenty-day limit without the 
consent of the enjoined party, the TRO should be treated as a preliminary 
injunction and will likely be immediately appealed by the enjoined party.101 
 
[40]  Rule 65 does not set time limits for TRO’s issued with notice, though 
most courts simply adopt the same time limits for TRO’s issued without 





[41]  Ordinarily, an appeal does not lie from an order granting (or denying) a 
TRO.104 However, if the TRO has been extended beyond the twenty-day 
limit, it is treated as a preliminary injunction and may be appealed,105 even if 
the enjoined party consented to the extension.106  Furthermore, when a TRO 
                                                 
101 See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-88 (1974).  Unlike a TRO, a preliminary 
injunction is appealable. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing appeals 
of TROs).  Appealing such an improperly extended TRO is the proper course of action, since 
violating even an improperly extended TRO may subject the violating party to contempt.  
See Levine v. Comcoa, Ltd., 70 F.3d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding the violating 
party in contempt after notice and an opportunity to be heard).  Note that where there has 
been no notice to the parties and no hearing on the various factors involved in considering a 
preliminary injunction, a TRO continued past the time limit automatically ceases.  Id. at 
1193 n.7. 
102 See, e.g., Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 
433 n.7 (1974). 
103 See, e.g., Horn Abbot, Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 360, 370 n.12 (1984) 
(“[W]here . . . notice has been given and a hearing has been held, the court may in its 
discretion impose the order for twenty days initially, pending a prompt hearing on a 
preliminary injunction within that time.”). 
104 See Miller v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 1268, 1269 (9th Cir. 1984).  
105 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text 
(indicating that TROs are treated as preliminary injunctions when extended beyond twenty 
days). 
106 See In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1982).  
It can be said that: 
 
when a temporary restraining order is extended far 
beyond its statutory limits, even though it is 
authorized by the consent of the party against whom 
it is directed, such an order begins to lose its 
character as a temporary restraining order and begins 
taking on characteristics of a preliminary injunction 
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effectively decides the merits of the case, it is again treated as a preliminary 
injunction and is therefore appealable.107  This argument would likely be 
difficult to make in a trademark infringement case unless temporary loss of 
use of the mark in question would effectively prevent any further use. 
 
[42]  Notwithstanding any issues as to appeal, the restrained party may move 
to dissolve or modify the TRO even before the preliminary injunction 
hearing.108  If the parties are adequately prepared, such a hearing may be 
treated as an application for a preliminary injunction.109  In such a hearing, 
the burden is on the party seeking the injunction to establish the need for 
such relief.110 
 




[43]  A preliminary injunction is generally sought when a plaintiff seeks to 
halt a defendant’s use of an infringing trademark while awaiting a trial on the 
merits, but has either elected not to seek a TRO or was denied a TRO, 
usually because the threat of irreparable harm could not be shown to be 
sufficiently immediate.  Additionally, when a TRO has been issued, courts 
often issue an OSC.111  Like a TRO, a preliminary injunction is essentially an 
                                                                                                                         
 
Id.   
107 See Romer v. Green Point Sav. Bank, 27 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the 
serious ramifications of a TRO preventing a planned stock conversion within the time 
allotted by law). 
108 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b), which states: 
 
[o]n [two] days notice to the party who obtained the 
temporary restraining order without notice or on such 
shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, 
the adverse party may appear and move its 
dissolution or modification and in that event the court 
shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as 
expeditiously as the ends of justice require. 
 
109 See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 441 
(1974). 
110 See id. (“[T]he party seeking the injunction would bear the burden of demonstrating 
the various factors justifying preliminary injunctive relief, such as the likelihood of 
irreparable injury to it if an injunction is denied and its likelihood of success on the merits.”). 
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order from a court to a defendant to immediately cease any further use of an 
infringing mark for the purpose of preserving the status quo.112 
 
[44]  When an OSC113 has been issued, the moving papers supporting the 
TRO application, along with any additional declarations or memoranda 
responding to points raised in the defendant’s papers, are generally used as 
the moving papers supporting the application for a preliminary injunction.114  
If no TRO was applied for, then the moving papers generally should include 
“[a] Notice of Application and Application for Preliminary Injunction; [a] 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of [the] Motion; [any] 
Affidavits and/or Declarations in Support of [the] Motion; [and a] Proposed 
Order Granting [the] Motion.”115  Local rules may require additional moving 
papers. 
 
[45]  The plaintiff must couch its request for a preliminary injunction as one 
based upon a strong showing that: (1) it is likely to prevail on the merits at 
trial; and (2) it will continue to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary 
injunction is not granted.116  For instance, in Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., a 
                                                 
112 See Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
113 See supra Part II.A.5. 
114 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:153. 
115 See id., § 13.154; see also Welker v. Cicerone, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001) (stating that “declarations and evidence supporting [a preliminary injunction 
motion] need not conform to the standards for a summary judgment motion or to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,” due to “the urgency involved and the limited time that a preliminary 
injunction remain [sic] in effect”). 
116 Each circuit has its own formulation of this standard.  See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading 
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that a preliminary injunction 
will issue if there is a likelihood of success on merits, irreparable harm will occur if the 
injunction does not issue, the threat of injury to the movant outweighs any harm the 
injunction may inflict on the non-movant, and granting the preliminary injunction will not 
violate public interest); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an injunction will issue if there exists either a likelihood of 
success on merits and the threat of irreparable injury or if serious questions are raised and the 
balance of hardships tips in favor of the movant); Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 
201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that an injunction will issue if there exists 
irreparable injury and either likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits to make them fair grounds for litigation).  The Federal Circuit 
reviews procedural matters under the law of the regional circuit in which the district court 
sits.  See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (holding that the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the circuit in which the district 
court sits in reviewing a lower court’s decision to grant or deny a request for injunctive 
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manufacturer of small, plush animals filled with plastic pellets sold under the 
BEANIE BABIES mark brought suit against a competitor.117  The 
competitor, a licensee of NASCAR, began manufacturing and selling 
BEANIE RACERS, which are bean-filled replicas of NASCAR racing 
cars.118  The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction.119  In affirming the 
grant of preliminary injunctive relief, the circuit court employed a sliding 
scale analysis which found that “the more likely the plaintiff will succeed on 
the merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need favor the plaintiff’s 
position.”120 
 
[46]  In order to employ this sliding scale analysis, the court first must 
determine whether the plaintiff has some likelihood of success on the merits 
of the underlying action.121  In order to demonstrate a likelihood of success 
on the merits, the plaintiff must establish: “‘(1) that it has a protectible 
trademark, and (2) a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the 
defendant’s product.’”122  The burden of proof, however, does not rise to a 
full trial on the merits; rather, at the preliminary injunction stage, the plaintiff 
need only demonstrate “that it has a ‘better than negligible’ chance of 
succeeding on the merits so that injunctive relief would be justified.”123 
                                                                                                                         
The remaining circuits articulate a standard based upon likelihood of success on the 
merits and irreparable injury.  See Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 
800, 803 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 
2003); Sugar Busters, LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999); Taubman Co. v. 
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003); AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 
F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2002); Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 
F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1999); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th 
Cir. 1991); Int’l Cosmetics Exch., Inc. v. Gapardis Health & Beauty, Inc., 303 F.3d 1242, 
1246 (11th Cir. 2002). 
117 Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001). 
118 Id. at 895. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  “A party seeking to obtain a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) its case 
has some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that no adequate remedy at law exists; and 
(3) it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.” Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. 
Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992)).  If these first three conditions are met, 
then the court must: (4) “consider the irreparable harm that the nonmoving party will suffer 
if preliminary relief is granted;” and (5) “consider the public interest.”  Id. (citing Storck 
USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1994)).   
121 Id. at 896.  
122 Id. at 897 (citing Int’l Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084 
(7th Cir. 1988)).  To demonstrate that it has a protectible trademark, the movant must show 
that “it has a better than negligible chance of proving that the mark has acquired secondary 
meaning.”  Id. 
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[47]  In Ty, Inc., the district court previously determined that four of the 
confusion factors were in favor of the defendant: (1) the degree of care; (2) 
the strength of the marks; (3) actual confusion; and (4) lack of intent to palm 
off the goods of the plaintiff.124  The district court determined, and the 
appellate court affirmed, however, that the manner of the BEANIE mark and 
Jones’ BEANIE RACERS mark created a better than negligible chance of a 
likelihood of confusion.125  The court also determined that the harm to the 
movant would be more significant if a preliminary injunction did not issue.126  
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the granting of the preliminary 
injunction.127 
 
[48]  Once the plaintiff demonstrates a colorable claim, it must then 
demonstrate that the hardship to the plaintiff in denying the injunction 
outweighs the defendant’s burden should the injunction be granted.128  In 
                                                                                                                         
 
(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of 
the goods; (3) the relationship between the parties’ 
channels of trade; (4) the relationship between the 
parties’ advertising; (5) the classes of prospective 
purchasers; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the 
defendants’ intent in its adopting mark; and (8) the 
strength of the plaintiff’s mark.   
 
I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 43 (1st Cir. 1998).  In considering 
whether products are closely related for the purposes of likelihood of confusion, “[a] ‘closely 
related’ product is one ‘which would reasonably be thought by the buying public to come 
from the same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the 
trademark owner.’”  Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 958 (7th 
Cir. 1992).   
Each circuit has its own formulation of the above mentioned factors for determining 
likelihood of confusion.  See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d 
Cir. 1961); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983); Resorts of 
Pinehurst v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 422-23 (4th Cir. 1998); Sunbeam Prods., 
Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 257 (5th Cir. 1997); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big 
Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 
7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d 
1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1997); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 
1979); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th 
Cir. 1999); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 972 (11th Cir. 1983); 
In re E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).   
124 Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 898.  
125 Id. at 901.  
126 Id. at 901-02.  
127 Id. at 904. 
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other words, the plaintiff must show that the hardships it would endure if 
such relief is not granted are greater than the hardships the defendant would 
endure if such relief is granted.  
 
[49]  In the context of a trademark infringement case, the plaintiff will 
naturally point out the hardships of sacrificing the marketing of its mark and 
the loss of sales due to consumer confusion as to the plaintiff’s affiliation 
with the defendant’s goods or services.  On the other hand, the defendant will 
argue the hardship of losing its right to do business under its chosen mark, 
which may represent its very business identity and existence.  The balance of 
hardships, then, may depend upon a comparison of the length of time the 
plaintiff and the defendant have been using the mark and the amount of 
resources each has invested in the mark.  Any delay by the plaintiff in 
bringing the infringement action may be used against it, as the defendant will 
argue that its hardship increases with the passage of time.129 
 
[50]  Once the court determines the benefits and burdens of deciding to grant 
or deny a request for injunctive relief, it must then look to the public’s best 
interests.130  In the context of trademark infringement cases, the relevant 
public entity is the consumer.131  In other words, courts seek to protect the 
public interest in trademark infringement cases by protecting the buying 
public in regards to whatever goods or services are the subject of the mark in 
dispute.132 
 
[51]  Generally, the plaintiff will argue that protection of consumers includes 
protection from the deception of a confusingly similar mark.133  If the ever 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 86-C-6159, 1987 WL 6300, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1987) (holding that the plaintiff’s three month delay in bringing suit 
increased the balance of hardships in the defendant’s favor and contributed to the court’s 
decision to deny preliminary injunction).   
130 See PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (E.D. Mich. 
2000).  
131 See Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir. 
1982) (upholding an injunction against the defendant enjoining any further trading of futures 
contracts based upon the plaintiff’s stock index which made use of the plaintiff’s name, 
marks, and reputation). 
132 See Dentsply Int’l, Inc. v. Great White, Inc. 132 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (M.D. Pa. 
2000) (“Where a likelihood of confusion arises out of the concurrent use of an infringing 
mark, the infringer’s use damages the public interest by spawning confusion in the market.”). 
133 See United States v. Washington Mint, L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1105 (D. Minn. 
2000) (“The public interest favors injunctive relief in the trademark infringement context 
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important likelihood of confusion can be established, then the plaintiff can 
argue that it naturally follows that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary 
to protect consumers from such confusion.134  This argument is particularly 
important when the balance of hardships is relatively even, possibly tipping 
the scales in favor of preliminary injunctive relief.135 
 
[52]  On the other hand, the defendant may argue that protecting the public 
interest includes giving consumers a competitive free market, which would 
be adversely affected by imposition of preliminary injunctive relief on the 
defendant’s use of the disputed mark.136 Because the consumer protection 
arguments of both the plaintiff and the defendant are valid, satisfying this 
requirement may well come down to a balancing of these two 
considerations,137 and the court’s determination will likely turn on the 
strength of the plaintiff’s case.138 
 
2. Supporting Evidence 
 
[53]  The remedy of a preliminary injunction does not involve as great a 
degree of exigency as does a TRO.  Therefore, because the time constraints 
                                                 
134 See, for example, Opticians Ass’n of America v. Lenox Laboratories., Inc., 920 F.2d 
187 (3d Cir. 1990), which states that: 
 
[p]ublic interest can be defined a number of ways, 
but in a trademark case, it is most often a synonym 
for the right of the public not to be deceived or 
confused.  Having already established that there is a 
likelihood of consumer confusion created by the 
concurrent use of the [marks at issue], it follows that 
if such use continues, the public interest would be 
damaged.  Conversely, a prohibition upon [further] 
use of the marks would eliminate that confusion.  
 
Id. at 197-98 (citations omitted). 
135 See MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 30:51-52. 
136 See, e.g., Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 505 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (“By the very nature of a trademark action, the value placed on free competition 
must be weighed against any individual’s property interest in that trademark, so that the 
analytic focus should also be on the consumer’s ability to obtain the lowest priced goods.”). 
137 See, e.g., Aveda Corp. v. Evita Mktg., 706 F. Supp. 1419, 1431-32 (D. Minn. 1989) 
(“[The public interest factor] involves balancing of the interest in protecting the public from 
confusion or deception with the interest in a competitive market.”).  
138 See, e.g., Waldmann Lighting Co. v. Halogen Lighting Sys., Inc., No. 91-C-3491, 
1993 WL 243388, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 1993) (“[T]he question of whether the ‘public 
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are not as strict, a detailed evidentiary showing should be provided to the 
court, including detailed factual and expert declarations.  The factual 
declarations can be from consumers that were confused between the marks of 
the movant and the non-movant, as well as declarations from company 
executives concerning expansion of product lines, other instances of actual 
confusion, and the monetary and non-monetary damage to the mark.139  
 
[54]  Depending upon the size of the litigation and the potential for damage, a 
movant may desire to designate several consultants upon the filing of the 
action, including consultants with specialties in corrective advertising, 
damages, licensing, linguistics, the expansion of the products, trademark law, 
and surveys.140  Experts can be retained based upon the findings within each 
consultant report.141  These experts can then generate reports that would be 
                                                 
139 Two unreported cases in which Mr. Spiess, co-author, participated as counsel address 
the form that factual declarations may take.  See LTT Int’l Dev. & Trading Corp. v. ABC 
Distrib., Inc., No. CV 00-00776 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2000); City Fin. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 
99-CV-1323 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 1999).  
140 For instance, in Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. CV 98-00094 LGB (C.D. Cal., Jan. 
7, 1998), the plaintiffs filed suit over Pfizer’s use of the identical TROVAN mark.  The 
plaintiffs retained several consultants, six of whom were later designated as experts: Weston 
Anson, Nancy J. Budd, Dr. Jacob Jacoby, Neil A. Smith, Michael J. Wagner, and David 
Yerkes.  The offices of Mr. Anson prepared a report regarding the potential for the licensing 
of the TROVAN mark.  Nancy Budd prepared a report regarding corrective advertising.  
Jacob Jacoby commissioned a consumer survey, sampling physicians.  Neil Smith prepared a 
declaration regarding trademark law.  Michael Wagner prepared a report regarding damages.  
David Yerkes prepared a report regarding the origin of the word “Trovan.”   
At about this same time, Pfizer filed a motion for summary judgment.  See Trovan, Ltd. 
v. Pfizer, Inc., Case No. CV 98-00094 LGB (C.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 1998).  With the assistance 
of these experts, at least one of whom filed a declaration in support of the opposition to 
summary judgment, Trovan was able to defeat the motion.  See Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc., 
Case No. CV 98-00094 LGB (C.D. Cal., Feb. 24, 1999) (under seal).  A trial was then held 
on the merits.  The majority of these experts testified at trial.  See generally Trovan, Ltd. v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 2000 WL 709149 (C.D. Cal. 2000).  The plaintiffs subsequently moved for a 
new trial and appealed the denial of the granting of a permanent injunction.  See Trovan, Ltd. 
v. Pfizer, Inc., 2001 WL 1346020 (9th Cir. 2001).   
After appellate procedure, the Lanham Act claim  the only claim remaining  was 
dismissed by the district court.  See Trovan, Ltd. v. Pfizer, Inc., Case No. CV 98-00094 LGB 
(C.D. Cal., July 28, 2003).  The case is currently pending on appeal.  
141 See supra notes 67, 140 and accompanying text.  A variety of experts can be retained.  
For instance, in Seven Lives, Inc. v. Montoya, Case No. 00-CV-8851 CBM (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
21, 2000) (unreported case in which Mr. Speiss, co-author, participated as counsel), the 
plaintiff moved for, and received, a TRO, though the TRO did not go into effect until 
December 7, 2000, because plaintiffs did not post required bond until that date.  The 
defendants then retained an expert in the gourmet cookie industry.  Through her declaration, 
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provided to the non-movant, who may then seek to depose the experts or 




[55]  In contrast to TROs, preliminary injunctions must be issued with 
notice.143  Such notice must be given to the “adverse party,” including 
opposing parties and any nonparties who will be directly affected by the 
preliminary injunction.144  The amount of notice required varies from court to 
court.  Some courts require a five-day notice, while other courts require 
notice adequate under the totality of circumstances.145 
 
                                                                                                                         
making were not the original creations of the plaintiffs, but rather were in the public domain.  
The motion for preliminary injunction was denied.   
According to at least one expert, however, “an adverse inference for failure to present 
survey evidence of confusion is never appropriate on an application for a temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction motion.”  Sandra Edelman, Failure to Conduct a 
Survey in Trademark Infringement Cases: A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90 
TRADEMARK REP. 746, 766 (2000).  Edelman goes on to say that: 
 
The burden of amassing the necessary evidentiary 
showing in a  compressed period of time is onerous 
enough without expecting the movant to have 
conducted a survey.  In many instances, if a plaintiff 
acts promptly, the defendant's products or sales 
material may not yet be publicly available, making it 
quite difficult to use the product or material in a 
survey.  In any event, the movant for preliminary 
injunctive relief need only show a probability of 
success at trial; it should not, therefore, be necessary 
for the movant to put forward its entire case at such 
an early stage of the proceedings. 
 
Id.  
142 See, e.g., Anthony L. Fletcher & David J. Kera, The Fiftieth Year of Administration 
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 741, 789 (1997).  If the non-
moving party designates its own experts, the moving party may desire to designate its own 
rebuttal experts.  If an expert report is not rebutted, the court may infer that it was due to the 
strength of the report, and not the cost of retaining a rebuttal expert.    
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1). 
144 See Parker v. Ryan, 960 F.2d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1992). 
145 Compare id. (listing only “two exceptional circumstances under which compliance 
with [the five-day requirement] is not required), with Rosen v. Siegel, 106 F.3d 28, 32 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (requiring such notice as to give the adverse party “fair opportunity” to prepare 
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[56]  If a TRO has been sought, notice of the preliminary injunction is 
effected by service of the TRO (if issued), the OSC, the summons, and the 
complaint (if not already served).146 The OSC will set forth the requirements 
for notice.147 Otherwise, notice is generally effected by service of a notice of 
motion.148 Again, local rules may apply. 
 
4. Procedure and Bond 
 
[57]  As with TROs, applications for preliminary injunctions should be filed 
as soon as is practical under the circumstances.149  Any delay may result in 
some question as to the urgency or irreparable nature of the injury, and may 
result in prejudicial reliance on the part of the defendant.150  Some local rules 
require a conference before filing a motion for a preliminary injunction in 
order to allow opposing counsel the opportunity to discuss the substance of 
the motion and a possible resolution.151  If a TRO has been sought, the time 
                                                 
146 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:152.10. 
147 See id. 
148 Id. § 13:152.11. 
149 See Edelman, supra note 35, at 649-50.  For example, the following generalizations 
apply to cases within the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:  
 
(1) [a] delay of less than three months is usually 
acceptable; (2) [b]etween three and six months, the 
decisions vary; (3) [f]or cases in which the delay is 
between six and twelve months, there is a significant 
risk that the motion will be denied; and (4) [i]n light 
of the above, any plaintiff should carefully consider 
the high risks and attendant extra fees and costs of 
seeking preliminary injunctive relief from a New 
York federal court when the delay is greater than one 
year. 
 
Id. at 650-51 (citations omitted).  
150 See, e.g., Ideal Indus., Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 
1979) (discussing “whether the [fact that the] defendant had been lulled into a false sense of 
security or had acted in reliance on the plaintiff’s delay” influences whether the court will 
find that the plaintiff’s decision to delay in moving for a preliminary injunction is 
acceptable); c.f. Edelman supra note 35, at 654-55 (“The lack of uniformity among the 
various circuit courts as to the relevance of the defendant’s prejudicial reliance continues to 
be shown in cases [recently] reported . . . .”).    
151 See e.g., C.D. CAL. L.R. 7-3 (requiring such conference at least twenty days before 
filing of the motion).  Such a requirement effectively postpones any hearing on the motion 
for a significant amount of time.  Under C.D. CAL. L.R. 7-3, for example, a hearing on the 
motion is postponed for at least forty-one days—the twenty-day waiting period is added to 
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for filing opposing papers will generally be set by the OSC; otherwise, the 
time requirements for such papers are the same as for motions generally.152   
 
[58]  Discovery may be necessary to prepare for the preliminary injunction 
hearing. Generally, discovery may not be conducted until the parties meet to 
confer about the case.153 However, either party may seek an order permitting 
immediate discovery by showing an urgent need for information.154  In 
addition, the party seeking injunctive relief must be prepared to post a bond 
of the injunctive relief if granted.  As with granting a TRO, the court must 





[59]  When a TRO has been issued, the OSC generally sets the date for the 
hearing of the preliminary injunction.156  If the TRO was issued without 
notice, the hearing date must be set for the “earliest possible time.”157  Local 
rules may further specify time limits, regardless of notice.158  If no TRO has 
issued, an application for a preliminary injunction is generally treated like 
other motions regarding procedure.159  However, local rules may again 
specify time limits based on various circumstances.160 
 
[60]  The nature of the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction is 
entirely up to the court’s discretion.161  In fact, the court has discretion to 
                                                 
152 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:156. 
153 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). 
154 See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1326 (9th Cir. 1994). 
155 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2954 (citing Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. 
Allied Old English, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ($100,000 bond posted); Storck 
USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 797 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ($1.5 million bond 
posted)); see also supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.  In Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, 
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 903-04 (7th Cir. 2001), the appellate court found that the magistrate 
judge did not leave the defendant in a vulnerable position prior to a hearing on the merits.  
The judge “provided for a bond of $50,000, which he believed would adequately compensate 
[the defendant] for any harm that may result from the preliminary injunction.”  Id. at 903.   
156 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:146.  
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
158 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:148.  
159 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:149. 
160 See, e.g., C.D. CAL. L.R.  65-1 (stating that where a TRO is sought but denied, a 
hearing may be set without regard to the twenty-one-day notice of motion normally 
required). 
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decide the matter relying entirely on affidavits.162  Most courts, however, 
permit hearings, at least when material facts are in dispute.163  Of course, the 
burden of persuasion remains with the party seeking injunctive relief.164 
 
[61]  Generally, evidence is presented to the court in the form of declarations 
or affidavits.165  Although the court has discretion to allow live testimony,166 
such testimony is rarely allowed.167  As with TROs, the court has discretion 
to allow even inadmissible evidence when hearing a preliminary 
injunction.168 
 
[62]  Courts also have the discretion to order an advancement of the trial on 
the merits and consolidate the trial with the hearing on the application for the 
preliminary injunction.169 This is particularly likely when live testimony is 
being allowed.170 
 
6. Order and Duration  
 
[63]  If the preliminary injunction is granted, the court will generally base its 
order on the moving party’s Proposed Order Granting the Motion, or at least 
adopt those sections that it finds adequate.171  As with a TRO, the proposed 
order should specifically describe the reasons for its issuance and the acts to 
be enjoined, or items to be seized.172  Furthermore, the proposed order should 
direct the injunction to all persons sought to be enjoined.173  Whether or not 
                                                 
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 43(e). 
163 See, e.g., Landmark Land Co., Inc. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 990 F.2d 807, 812 
(5th Cir. 1993) (finding that an evidentiary hearing is only necessary when the parties 
dispute material facts and that otherwise a hearing on the basis of briefs and affidavits is 
sufficient). 
164 See W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 1982). 
165 See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:165. 
166 See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(e). 
167 See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1326 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to 
allow oral testimony when the parties had been given a full opportunity to submit written 
testimony and argue the matter).  But see McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 
1311-12 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that live testimony should be allowed when facts are 
bitterly disputed and credibility determinations are necessary). 
168 See Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984).  Note, 
however, that courts are likely to give inadmissible evidence its proper weight of authority. 
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2). 
170 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:171. 
171 Id. § 13:182. 
172 See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text; see also Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 
Bhd. of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974).   
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the preliminary injunction is granted, the court must set forth, either in 
writing or orally, the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which it is 
basing its decision.174  
 
[64]  The court has discretion to decide when the injunction becomes 
effective.175  If the court requires the movant to post a bond, however, the 
injunction cannot become effective until the bond is secured.176  If there is 
danger of irreparable harm occurring before the appropriate paperwork can 
be filed and the bond secured, the court may either orally restrain the parties 
to be enjoined or extend a previously issued TRO for a reasonable period.177 
 
[65]  Although a preliminary injunction is considered a final order for the 
purposes of appeal, “the [issuing] court retains the power to modify or 
dissolve the injunction at any time on consideration of new facts,” or when 
there has been a final decision on the merits and a permanent injunction 
issues.178 
 
7. Appeal  
 
[66]  “The opposing party has the right to appeal the granting of a 
preliminary injunction.”179  This order can be appealed “only when it is 
directed to a party, is enforceable by contempt, and grants (or denies) part or 
                                                 
174 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); see Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1178-79 (3d Cir. 1990).   
175 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:184.   
176 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c); see also supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.  
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:191, states that: 
  
[e]xcept for the United States, no party may be 
granted a TRO or preliminary injunction without first 
posting security “in such sum as the court deems 
proper for the payment of such costs and damages as 
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is 
found to have been wrongfully enjoined.” 
 
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c)).   
177 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:185. 
178 Id. § 13:212.  
179 Id. § 13:1.1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000); SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 
13:10 (“In recognition of their impact, a right of appeal exists from orders granting, denying, 
modifying or dissolving preliminary injunctions.”); see also Dayton Area Visually Impaired 
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all of the ultimate relief sought in the suit.”180  From the entry of a 
preliminary injunction a party has thirty days to file a notice of appeal.181  In 
addition, the “[f]ailure to appeal the grant or denial of a preliminary 
injunction does not preclude appeal of a later grant or denial of a permanent 
injunction.”182  
 
III. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS FOR RESOLVING TRADEMARK DISPUTES 
 
[67]  There are many forms of civil dispute negotiations, including 
mediation, alternative dispute resolution, and arbitration. These forms of 
negotiation can all occur in lieu of the filing of a lawsuit, or at any time 
during the pendency of the suit.183  These negotiations differ from 
transactional negotiations in that one or more parties believe they have rights 
against the other that are legally enforceable.184  These rights may be real or 
                                                 
180 Chronicle Publ’g. Co. v. Hantzis, 902 F.2d 1028, 1030 (1st Cir. 1990).  In addition, 
“[t]he order need not be labeled as an injunction” in order to be appealed; “[o]rders having 
the ‘practical effect’ of an injunction may be appealable under § 1292(a)(1) if they have 
potentially irreparable consequences, and can effectively be challenged only by an 
immediate appeal.”  SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:215.1 (quoting Carson v. Am. 
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)).   
181 SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, § 13:216; see id. (explaining that the period may 
be extended upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect). 
182 Id. § 13:215.10. 
183 Upon the filing of an action, most district courts require that the parties conduct an 
early meeting of counsel.  During this early meeting of counsel, the parties are more often 
than not required to select a forum in which to participate in settlement discussions.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (“[T]he parties must, as soon as practicable . . . confer to consider . . . 
the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case . . . .”).  The local rules of 
the district court in which the lawsuit is filed may specify the mediation procedures that can 
be used.  For example, C.D. CAL. L.R. 16-14, states: 
 
[i]t is the policy of the Court to encourage disposition 
of civil litigation by settlement when such is in the 
best interest of the parties.  The Court favors any 
reasonable means to accomplish this goal. . . .  The 
parties are urged first to discuss and to attempt to 
reach settlement among themselves without resort to 
these procedures.  It is also the policy of the Court 
that unless an alternative settlement procedure is 
selected by the parties, the judge assigned to preside 
over the civil case (the trial judge) may participate in 
facilitating settlement. 
 
184 Sankary, supra note 8, at 1.  The goals of business negotiation are as follows: (1) 
“[t]o achieve business and financial objectives;” (2) “[t]o maintain business relationships;” 
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perceived.  For instance, the grant or denial of a TRO or preliminary 
injunction will provide clarity as to whether these rights are in fact real, or 
merely fictional.  In addition, the defendant may chose to file a Rule 68 offer 
of judgment in order to put settlement pressure on the plaintiff.185  Based 
upon these rights, the parties will predict the probable trial outcome and 
assign a dollar value to the dispute.186  
 
[68] Regardless of how negotiations are to proceed, the parties must 
communicate with each other in order to resolve the dispute successfully.187  
Each party must listen actively, acknowledge what is being said, speak to be 
                                                                                                                         
for consequences arising from obligations set forth in [the] agreement;” and (6) “[t]o provide 
an efficient and cost-effective method of resolving disputes.”  Id. at 2.    
185 A Rule 68 offer of judgment “provides a procedure by which defendants may be able 
to put cost pressure on plaintiffs.”  See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 11, at § 15:150.  
 
[U]p to 10 days before trial, defendant may serve 
plaintiff with an offer to allow judgment to be taken 
against the defendant for a specified amount of 
money or property with costs then accrued; [i]f 
plaintiff accepts, and the offer and notice of 
acceptance are filed with the court, the clerk must 
enter judgment accordingly; [i]f the offer is not 
accepted within 10 days after service, it is deemed 
withdrawn. Evidence thereof is inadmissible at trial. 
But if the judgment recovered by plaintiff at trial is 
not “more favorable” than the defendant’s offer, 
plaintiff must pay defendant’s costs incurred after the 
offer was made. 
 
Id.  “Rule 68 applies only to offers made by defendants.  No similar procedure is 
provided for settlement demands by plaintiff[s].”  Id. at § 15:150.1 (citing Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350 (1981)).  It is recommended that the defendant 
file such an offer prior to entering into settlement negotiations.  
186 Sankary, supra note 8, at 1. Based upon perceived leverage, negotiations ensue in 
order to settle the dispute. See generally ROY J. LEWICKI ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF 
NEGOTIATION 132-61 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing how parties should find and use leverage in 
the negotiation process).  Seeking leverage in negotiation usually arises from a perceived 
inequity of positions.  Id. at 132-33.  In these instances, a negotiator believes one of two 
things: she has less leverage than the opposing party, or she needs more leverage than the 
opposing party to increase the probability of securing a desired outcome.  Id. 
187 See FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 33.  There are three problems in communication: 
first, the negotiators may not be talking to each other in a way to be understood, i.e. they 
may be talking to impress their clients; second, a negotiating partner may not be paying 
attention to what is being said; and third, the parties may misinterpret what is being said.  Id. 
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understood, speak about the needs and motivations of its own client, and 
speak for a purpose.188    
 
A. Strategy Development 
 
[69]  It is helpful to develop a negotiation strategy outline prior to conducting 
the negotiation.  Negotiators must anticipate what they want to achieve in a 
negotiation and prepare for these events in advance.189  A negotiation 
strategy should include a prioritization of the client’s goals, contingency 
plans, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”), and 
procedural concerns dealing with agendas and bargaining histories.190  It 
should also contain a facilitation section, which discusses the client’s 
mindset, as well as an anticipatory outline of the opposing party’s mindset.191    
 
[70]  Practitioners must then seek to define the issues.  This process is called 
framing the negotiation.192  There are many different types of frames, 
including: (1) substantive, or what the conflict is about; (2) conflict 
management process; (3) characterization, or how the parties define 
themselves and who their opponent is; and (4) loss-gain, or how the parties 
view the risks associated with particular outcomes.193      
 
                                                 
188 Id. at 35-37.  
189 LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 32.  
190 See Michael W. Coombs, Strategy Outline II: Union-Management Negotiation 1 
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology); see 
also LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 32 (defining goals to include tangibles, such as “rate, 
price, specific terms, contract language, [and] fixed packages,” as well as intangibles, “such 
as maintaining a certain precedent, defending a principle, or getting an agreement regardless 
of cost”).  According to Robert H. Mnookin, “[t]he BATNA indicates what [the] negotiator 
can do away from the table if no deal is reached.  The BATNA must be translated into a 
reservation value  the amount at which the bargainer is indifferent between reaching a deal 
and walking away to his BATNA.”  Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute 
Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2003).   
191 Coombs, supra note 190, at 1.  Professor Coombs also suggests that negotiators 
should develop a list of: (1) “talking points” to enhance the credibility of their client; (2) 
items they should say in favor of their client; and (3) a series of open-ended questions which 
should be used to start and lead the negotiation.  Id. at 1-2.  In addition, the list should 
include strategic options, including how to negotiate.  Id. at 1.  Some strategies include the 
non-engagement strategy, as well as strategies of competition, collaboration and 
accommodation.  See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 36-40.  
192 See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 22 (“framing is the means by which the 
parties in a negotiation . . . define the problem”).   
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[71]  Most importantly, in developing the negotiation strategy and framing it 
to their clients and opponents, negotiators should look toward developing 
options for mutual gain that can be proposed to all parties present.194  This 
will allow them to maintain flexibility in the negotiation, and simultaneously 
convey a clear theme of what outcome the client desires.   If this theme is 
properly developed, the parties will be able to focus on interests, rather than 
on positions.195  
 
B. The Negotiation Process 
 
[72]  The client or person with full settlement authority should be physically 
present at the negotiation.196  Presence conveys symbolic importance.  It 
allows all parties to reason with, persuade, and guide one another towards 
resolution of the matter.197  
 
[73]  During the negotiation, in order to focus on interests rather than on 
positions, the parties must use objective criteria, meaning criteria that are 
practical and based on fact.198   In order to negotiate with objective criteria, 
the negotiators must: (1) continue to employ a framing technique, 
characterizing “each issue as a joint search for objective criteria;” (2) 
“[r]eason and be open to reason;” and (3) “[n]ever yield to pressure, only to 
principle.”199  
 
[74]  In practice, the negotiators must create a free flow of information.200  
Together with their clients, the negotiators must make a true effort to 
understand what the other side desires to achieve.201  Specifically, the 
                                                 
194 See id. at 31.  
195 See FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 41-57.    
196 Arthur Nakazato, Tips from the Bench on Handling Intellectual Property Cases (Aug. 
27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).  
If physical presence is not possible, however, the parties should take steps to create a face-to-
face relationship prior to the negotiation. 
197 See KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION IN PRACTICE 2-3 (1991).   
198 FISHER & URY, supra note 4, at 81-94. 
199 Id. at 88; see id. at 89 (“Insisting that an agreement be based on objective criteria 
does not mean insisting that it be based solely on the criterion you advance.  One standard of 
legitimacy does not preclude the existence of others.”). 
200 See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 99.  “[E]ffective information exchange 
promotes the development of good integrative solutions.  For the necessary exchange to 
occur, negotiators must be willing to reveal their true objectives and to listen to each other 
carefully.”  Id. at 96-97.   
201 See id. at 97 (suggesting that negotiators must be careful not to form predispositions 
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negotiators must identify and define the problem in a way that is mutually 
acceptable to both sides, depersonalize it, and then understand it.202  The 
negotiators must be firm about their client’s primary interests and needs, but 
flexible about the manner in which these needs are met. 203  They must also 
seek to form all communications with regard to content, structure, and 
delivery style.204  
 
C. Obstacles to Settlement 
 
[75]  There are four major obstacles to achieving a successful settlement.  
These barriers are: (1) strategic barriers; (2) principal and agent problems; (3) 
cognitive and psychological barriers; and (4) reactive devaluation or 
compromises and concessions.205   
 
1. Strategic Barriers 
 
[76]  Strategic barriers arise from the “tension between the desire for 
distributive gain — getting a bigger slice of the pie — and the opportunity 
for joint gains — finding ways to make the pie bigger.”206  The players in this 
game are often in an awkward position: “[t]hey want to make the most 
favorable agreement that they can, while avoiding the risk of making no 
agreement at all; and, to certain extent [sic], these goals are contradictory.”207  
                                                                                                                         
and their opponents); see also HERB COHEN, YOU CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING: HOW TO GET 
WHAT YOU WANT, 150 (1994) (arguing that negotiators must practice a win-win style, and 
seek to understand before being understood). 
202 See LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 98-101. 
203 See id. at 98.   
204 See id. at 159.  The content of the message should be focused on: (1) how to make 
the offer attractive to the other party; (2) how to frame the messages so the other party will 
say yes; (3) how to make messages normative; and (4) how to obtain agreements in 
principle.  Id. at 159-60.    
205 Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the 
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 239-47 (1993). 
206 Mnookin, supra note 190, at 4.  Further, “strategic barriers are those that can cause 
rational, self-interested disputants to act in a manner that proves to be both individually and 
collectively disadvantageous.”  Id. at 2; see also LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 186, at 118 
(“Those who believe in the mythical fixed pie assume that the possibility for integrative 
settlements and mutually beneficial trade-offs doesn’t exist, and they suppress efforts to 
search for such settlements or trade-offs.”). 
207 Mnookin, supra note 190, at 7.  It can also be said that:   
 
[i]f one party indicates a willingness to settle for any 
terms, even if the gain is only marginal, he or she will 
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“In sum, hard-bargaining tactics that may be rational for self-interested 
parties concerned with maximizing the size of their own slice of the pie can 
sometimes lead to inefficient outcomes.”208   
 
[77]  It goes without saying that “[t]hose subjected to such tactics often 
respond in kind.”  At the very best, the result is “additional costs of the 
dispute resolution process, and, at worst, failure to consummate a mutually 
beneficial agreement.”209  Therefore, “accurate information about each 
negotiator’s goals, priorities, preferences, resources, and opportunities is 
essential to reach agreements that offer optimal ‘gain from trade.’”210 
 
2. Principal and Agent Problems 
 
[78]  A corporate officer or director has a duty of care owed to the 
corporation.  First, “a director or officer must ‘perform his functions . . . with 
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to 
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.’”211  Second is 
the “‘business judgment rule,’ which describes the standard by which courts 
evaluate whether a director or officer has discharged his obligation.”212  
 
                                                                                                                         
one.  On the other hand, if he takes a hard position 
and sticks to it, he is likely to reach a favorable 
agreement if he reaches any agreement at all--but he 
stands a good chance of being left out in the cold. 
 
Id.  “Strategic barriers . . . reflect models of human behavior premised on rational, self-
interested parties seeking to maximize their own interests.”  Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. 
Mnookin, Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients: Symposium on Business 
Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995).  
208 Mnookin, supra note 190, at 7. 
209 Id.  
210 Id. at 14.  Keep in mind, however, that “total frankness and ‘full disclosure’  or 
simply greater frankness and fuller disclosure than practiced by the other side of the 
negotiation  leave one side vulnerable in the distributive aspect of bargaining.”  Id.  
211 Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market 
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 317 (1989) (quoting 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1985)).  
212 Id.  “The purpose of the business judgment rule is to protect officers and directors 
‘from risks inherent in hindsight reviews of their unsuccessful decisions, and to avoid the 
risk of stifling innovation and venturesome business activity.’”  Id. (quoting PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) cmt. d (Tentative 
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[79]  However, a corporate officer may be held personally liable despite the 
business judgment rule if they “fail[] to inform themselves of ‘all information 
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision.’”213  Therefore, 
“[b]ecause it is impossible to ascertain exactly how much information a court 
may require a director to have obtained in order” to become informed, 
corporate executives may be discouraged from settling a matter before they 
have exhausted all litigation remedies so as to avoid personal liability.214  
Faced with settling a matter prior to litigation and possibly incurring the 
wrath of a shareholder action, or litigating a matter that should have been 
settled, a corporate officer may choose the latter.215   
 
[80]  In addition, practitioners may be “a barrier to the efficient resolution of 
business disputes through early settlement.”216  For instance, defense lawyers 
may prolong an action that could be settled in their clients’ favor in order to 
continue to collect fees.217  Likewise, because plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
sometimes paid on a contingency basis, settlement might result despite the 
fact that it is not in their clients’ best interests, since the plaintiff’s counsel 
himself, due to the contingency fee agreement, may bear the costs of 
investigators, expert witnesses and trial.218  
 
3. Psychological Barriers 
 
[81]  Practitioners “tend to share and apply a rational, economically-
grounded analysis to determine whether to settle and upon what terms” in 
order to “facilitate[] distributive negotiation, rational decision making, and a 
higher rate of settlement.”219  Disputants, on the other hand, are influenced 
more by cognitive and social-psychological occurrences that may hinder their 
ability to rationally analyze expected financial values.220  “Psychological 
barriers, which are cognitive and perceptual in nature, prevent disputants 
                                                 
213 Id. at 319 (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)). 
214 Id. at 320-22.  
215 See id. at 317-22.  
216 Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 207, at 11.  
217 See id. at 12.    
218 See id.    
219 Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals In Court  Connected Mediation: What’s Justice 
Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 804 (2001) (citing Russell Korobkin & Chris 
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 77, 82-83, 95-112, 122 (1997)). 
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from acting in a value-maximizing, utilitarian manner.”221  These barriers 
include, but are not limited to, “the framing of settlement offers, personal 
animus and equity seeking, and the reactive devaluation of offers proposed 
by the adversary.”222  Because of these psychological barriers, a party may 
begin to incorrectly and unjustifiably assume the motives and intentions of 
the other party.223   
 
4. Reactive Devaluation or Compromises and Concessions 
 
[82]  Reactive devaluation is the “tendency to evaluate proposals less 
favorably after they have been offered by one’s adversary.”224  It stems from 
the belief that what is good for one side must be bad for the other side.225  
However, negotiations are rarely fixed-sum.226  In order to overcome reactive 
devaluation, it may be helpful to either: (1) have the client determine in 
advance what outcomes are acceptable to them; or (2) have the parties work 
together so that the solution is jointly initiated, or even appears as if it was 




[83]  Most clients seek the advice of counsel when they have only a general 
knowledge of a few of the items that are available on the legal buffet table, 
and they are often operating under prices that are several years old.  As 
trademark practitioners, we must deploy the following five-step approach 
when presented with a conflict.  
 
[84]  First, we must gather and analyze all evidence immediately available to 
our clients, and at our own disposal.  Second, we must then fully examine the 
immediacy of the injury to our clients.  Third, we must survey the buffet 
table, and provide our clients with detailed information regarding those items 
                                                 
221 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: 
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 117 (1994).   
222 Id.  
223 See SANKARY, supra note 8, at 3; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 817-18 (2001) (arguing that judges share many of same 
cognitive biases as others, including lawyers, but show less bias in some areas).  
224 Birke & Fox, supra note 7, at 48.  “Fixed-pie bias (i.e., the assumption that what is 
good for my counterpart must be bad for me) may contribute to reactive devaluation . . . .”  
Id.  
225 Id. at 49.   
226 Id. 
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that we believe may fulfill their needs. Simultaneous with this selection 
process, we must provide a budget analysis of the fees and costs associated 
with each item.  Fourth, after fully appraising our clients of all of the options 
available to them, we must counsel them to select an appropriate option.  
Fifth, we must be fully prepared for battle  to gather, analyze, stake 
appropriate claims, and then skillfully resolve the matter.   
 
 
